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Losing the Future: Household Wealth from Urban Housing 
Demolition and Children’s Human Capital in China 
Abstract: Some literature observes the negative but not very significant effect of household 
wealth growth on children’s educational outcomes. This surprising finding is not easily 
reconciled with the traditional explanation that relaxed economic constraints caused by wealth 
growth can promote human capital accumulation. This paper proposes an alternative explanation 
for the causal relationship between wealth growth and human capital, which could be negative: 
individuals tend to reduce human capital investment following the decline in their labor supply 
induced by wealth growth, given that investing in human capital is mainly for employment 
competitiveness. This explanation is supported by evidence from the case of urban housing 
demolition in China, in which affected households could obtain substantial wealth growth by 
considerable demolition compensation thanks to the real estate boom in China. Specifically, using 
two nationally representative datasets, we find that Chinese households that have experienced 
demolition relatively have more wealth, less labor supply, lower propensity to accumulate 
children’s human capital, and consequently, have children with lower educational achievement. 
These results suggest that China’s economy may be losing its momentum because of the decline 
in labor supply and human capital accumulation brought about by the ongoing large-scale urban 
housing demolition.  
Keywords: urban housing demolition, household wealth, labor supply, human capital 
JEL Classifications: J2, R380, P360 
1. Introduction 
Does household wealth growth improve children’s human capital, especially for instant 
and substantial wealth growth such as winning a lottery? If the lack of wealth constrains human 
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capital investment, as Becker and Tomes (1986) propose, an increase in wealth should relax 
budget constraints and help accumulate human capital, such as in the abundant findings of Filmer 
and Schady (2011), Lovenheim (2011), and Dahl and Lochner (2012). However, Picchio et al. 
(2017) and Cesarini et al. (2017) have demonstrated that exogenous wealth growth from winning 
a lottery would reduce labor supply. Intuitively, in such situation, because of the decreased labor 
supply, human capital accumulation could be less necessary given that the main reason for human 
capital accumulation is to promote employment competitiveness. Therefore, these lottery winners 
are probably less motivated to invest in human capital. Following this line, the outcomes of 
human capital accumulation related to wealth growth could be logically negative.  
Notably, some seminal studies (Bleakley and Ferrie, 2016; Cesarini et al., 2016) have not 
demonstrated the positive effect of winning a lottery on educational outcomes of children and 
grandchildren. By contrast, they have observed a negative but not very significant effect, but they 
do not provide a deeper exploration of these unusual results which Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) 
refer to as “shocking behavior”. Nevertheless, Hällsten and Pfeffer (2017) interpret the surprising 
finding of Cesarini et al. (2016) as strong evidence that Swedish households do not have 
economic constraints on education because of tuition-free education in Sweden. Bleakley and 
Ferrie (2016) infer that the role of household financial resources is limited in the formation of 
human capital of the next generations, in the unique historical environment they investigated. 
However, except for these two explanations for the no observation of the significantly positive 
effect, could household wealth growth have a negative effect on children’s human capital, 
particularly when educational participation is not constrained by economic resources?    
In this study, we suggest that an alternative explanation for the association between 
household wealth growth and children’s human capital, which could be negative, may be at work. 
When wealth increases significantly and labor supply thereby decreases, the importance of labor 
earnings and human capital accumulation should decrease. As a consequence, individuals tend to 
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relax their efforts to invest in the human capital of their children, and this eventually reduces the 
children’s educational achievement. Additionally, adults who have children have usually 
completed their education, leaving little scope to alter their own human capital.   
The unique case of urban housing demolition (UHD) in China offers several advantages 
when examining this explanation. First, thanks to the real estate boom, Chinese UHD resulting 
from large-scale urban renewal and real estate development could result in considerable economic 
compensation for affected households in the form of lump sums of money and real estate (Cai et 
al., 2018; Li et al., 2019). These financial windfalls for Chinese UHD households provide an 
opportunity to observe the significant wealth effects in China, namely, the association between 
household wealth growth and children’s human capital. Second, UHD is widespread in China. 
According to data from the 2013 Chinese Household Income Project, 13.30% of Chinese urban 
households had already experienced UHD by 2013. Third, economic constraints should not be a 
primary obstacle to children’s education in China because the law that requires 9 years of 
compulsory education and the free compulsory education reform were implemented in 1986 and 
2006, respectively (Xiao et al., 2017). In addition, the tuition fee in high schools and universities 
is relatively much lower than in the United States, and low-interest student loans are available. 
The Chinese condition of much lower economic constraints to educational participation allows us 
to more easily observe the potential negative effect of wealth. Otherwise, the positive effect on 
relaxing economic constraints could offset the negative effect such that the real effect of wealth 
growth may be blurred.  
We provide a series of evidence for our explanation by exploiting this UHD case in 
China. We examine the nationally representative panel data from the Chinese Family Panel 
Studies across 25 provinces by using the difference-in-differences (DID) approach. UHD in 
China increases household wealth substantially. Specifically, UHD households on overage have 
more houses (0.22 in number and at least RMB 276,241 in value) and more cash and bank 
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deposits (at least RMB 71,588 in value) after experiencing UHD, compared with non-UHD 
households. The estimated wealth growth for households that have experienced UHD is nearly 
equivalent to 15 years of individual income in China, based on the Chinese per capita disposable 
income in 2016 from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
Consequently, UHD with considerable wealth growth reduces individual labor supply. 
The probability of being employed decreases by 3.77 percentage points caused by UHD overall, 
and the magnitude is much larger for women than men (8.79 percentage points for women vs. 
1.48 percentage points for men). Furthermore, the finding of the positive effect of UHD on 
individual life satisfaction could rule out the possibility that the decline in labor supply is from 
the negative effects of UHD, such as the forced evictions documented in Ho (2013b). Eventually, 
it results in the reduction of children’s human capital accumulation as predicted by our 
explanation. Affected by UHD, adults have lower propensity to accumulate their children’s 
human capital, indicated by 1.88 hours less of weekly tutoring their children and a 13.01 
percentage point lower probability to expect that their children obtain at least a bachelor’s degree. 
We further find evidence of relatively lower educational achievement for UHD group by the 
cross-sectional data from the 2013 Chinese Household Income Project. Children who experienced 
UHD before sitting for the College Entrance Test (CET)1 have CET scores nearly 20 points lower 
and a probability to enter elite universities in China that is ten percentage points lower compared 
with children who never experienced UHD. Similarly, children who experienced UHD before 
sitting for the High School Entrance Test (HET) are approximately 13 percentage points less 
likely to enter key high schools. However, we do not observe the same patterns for the 
comparisons between children who experienced UHD after CET or HET and those who never 
 
1 That is, households where children are from experienced UHD before children’s CET. 
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experienced UHD, suggesting UHD-related confounding factors, such as family size, are not 
dominant in our results.  
Our study contributes to the literature on wealth growth and human capital accumulation. 
As Hällsten and Pfeffer (2017) stress, exogenous wealth growth in a short time may lack the same 
social conditions of wealth accumulated and passed down over generations, such as related social 
norms. Therefore, the literature most relevant to our study is on exogenous wealth shocks, for 
example, cash transfer or other types of windfalls, and not accumulated family wealth. 
Researchers have concluded that increased wealth by cash transfer could have a positive 
influence on children’s human capital accumulation (Schultz, 2004; Case et al., 2005; De Janvry 
et al., 2006; Filmer and Schady, 2011; among many others). Moreover, wealth growth from liquid 
houses can promote investment in children’s human capital (Lovenheim, 2011). Increased income 
from the changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States has a positive effect on 
children’s educational achievement (Dahl and Lochner, 2012). Among them, Filmer and Schady 
(2011) further observe that a larger cash transfer could not have a larger positive impact on school 
enrollment of children than a modest cash transfer. Lovenheim (2011) asserts that the effect of 
wealth growth is mostly localized to lower-resource families. These two pieces of supplementary 
evidence might suggest the positive effect of wealth growth on human capital could be limited if 
economic constraints for educational participation have been almost relaxed. Our study is closest 
to Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) and Cesarini et al. (2016), that is, in contrast with the 
aforementioned literature, they demonstrated a negative but not very significant effect. 
Nevertheless, no studies have clearly documented the negative effect of wealth growth on human 
capital, resulting in the scope for the explanation proposed and examined by our study.  
Another main finding of our study—that the wealth from UHD reduces individual labor 
supply—also supports recent research on the causal relationship between wealth and labor 
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supply. van Huizen (2014), Picchio et al. (2017), and Cesarini et al. (2017) have provided solid 
evidence by using large samples from affluent countries (i.e., Sweden and the Netherlands) that 
windfalls negatively affect labor supply. However, for reasons such as the lack of available data, 
researchers have focused less on the wealth effects in China, where household wealth has been 
increasing significantly (Xie and Jin, 2015) and the labor shortage is becoming a prominent 
problem (Cui et al., 2018). Our finding in China, a country of diligent individuals whose 
government does not provide an adequate social safety net, lends further support to this 
relationship between wealth and labor supply. In addition, we find the magnitude of labor supply 
decrease induced by wealth growth is much larger for women than men. This result suggests a 
social norm in China may play a critical role, that is, men leave home to work while women 
remain at home and perform the work of household chores, such as explored by Chen and Ge 
(2018).  
Our study extends the understanding of real estate development in China from a new 
perspective. With the real estate industry becoming China’s economic pillar, the real estate boom 
and the subsequent risks of bursting bubbles have drawn much research attention. Although 
Glaeser et al. (2017) are optimistic about the housing bubble in China, detrimental consequences 
of rapid increases in housing prices have occurred. Li and Wu (2014) find that high housing 
prices in general discourage entrepreneurial activities for urban adults in China. Chen et al. 
(2018) show that housing unaffordability crowds out elites in Chinese superstar cities. Wrenn et 
al. (2019) ascribe part of the decline in rates of initial marriage in China to the increase in housing 
prices. Our study contributes to this strand of research by exploiting the case of UHD behind the 
real estate development in China. We conclude that UHD is at the cost of the decline in labor 
supply and human capital accumulation, a phenomenon that would probably lead to China’s 
economy losing its momentum. 
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The rest of our paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 provides policy 
background of UHD and education system in China. Section 3 describes the data and variables 
used in our study. Section 4 details the empirical strategy we employ. Section 5 presents the 
empirical findings. Section 6 concludes our paper. 
2. Policy background 
2.1. Urban housing demolition in China 
Due to the limitation of land resources, the rapid urbanization of cities in China since the 
reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s has occurred at the cost of massive demolition of 
existing old urban buildings. Following the emergence of the real estate market in the 1990s and 
the real estate boom since the 2000s, the skyrocketing housing prices have further reinforced the 
large-scale UHD conducted in China to free up land for real estate development, a phenomenon 
driven by local governments and property developers in the name of urban renewal. Specifically, 
13.30% of Chinese urban households had experienced UHD by 2013, based on data from the 
2013 Chinese Household Income Project. The overall number of households affected by UHD 
has increased continuously: 2.14% and 2.19% of Chinese urban households experienced UHD in 
2013 and 2015, respectively, according to data from the Chinese Family Panel Studies. Moreover, 
UHD remains the priority of the Chinese government’s economic policy because the top 
economic development plan, the 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020), stresses that China will 
continue to improve urbanization by developing new towns and optimizing urban space.  
UHD, urban renewal, and real estate development have largely contributed to the rapid 
growth of the economy in China and to the improvement in urban landscape and housing 
conditions of urban residents. However, the side effects of this process are also prominent and 
deeply affect Chinese society and economic development, namely, housing prices are a financial 
burden for residents, houses represent a substantial amount of household wealth, and thus 
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individuals and households have changed their behavior substantially (Li and Wu, 2014; Fu et al., 
2016; Chen et al., 2018; Fang and Tian, 2018; Wrenn et al., 2019; Zou and Deng, 2019). Notably, 
the economic studies of UHD in China have been insufficient except for some examples in the 
anthropology, urban and regional literature (Ho, 2013a,b; Zhang, 2018; Day and Cervero, 2010) 
that have reported on surveys of the side effects of forced evictions, bargaining during 
demolition, and residential relocation caused by UHD.  
The household wealth gains from UHD remain unclear. Ho (2013a) and Wong (2015) 
have mentioned that UHD may lead to substantial wealth gains for affected households, but this 
argument has not been examined by representative data. Li and Song (2009) use a survey of 1200 
households conducted in Shanghai in 2006 and find that the housing conditions of displaced 
households thanks to UHD are somewhat better. However, they do not calculate the details of 
wealth growth induced by UHD including house and money of households. Therefore, more 
careful investigations of the wealth effects of UHD are necessary.   
2.2. Chinese education system 
The Chinese education system basically comprises four levels: elementary school, middle 
school, high school, and university. Students sit for two important national tests: the HET and 
CET. The HET and CET scores determine whether children enter high schools or universities for 
further higher-level education as well as key high schools or elite universities for higher-quality 
education. Chinese children aged 6 or 7 usually start their education in elementary schools. The 
law that implemented 9 years of compulsory education and the free compulsory education reform 
were introduced in 1986 and 2006, respectively (Xiao et al., 2017). Thus, 6 years of elementary 
school and 3 years of middle school are a basic requirement for Chinese children, and not 
constrained by parents’ income. Moreover, in China, attending a public high school or university 
costs approximately $200 or $700 per year, much lower than in the United States. If children’s 
parents cannot afford the tuition, they can apply for low-interest student loans. Hence, economic 
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constraints may not be an apparent obstacle for Chinese children to acquire education and 
accumulate human capital. Instead, other factors could play a more notable role, such as the 
willingness and determination of parents and children to achieve educational success. 
The Chinese education system is the main path for Chinese children to accumulate 
human capital. According to data from the 2013 Chinese Household Income Project, 0.005% of 
Chinese citizens have a foreign bachelor’s degree, although studying abroad is becoming an 
increasingly popular choice as a means for wealthy parents and students to avoid the fierce 
education competition in China. However, most Chinese parents and children are still heavily 
incentivized to do well in Chinese education system if they attach importance to the investment in 
human capital of children. Notably, most ordinary Chinese households do not have the capacity to 
afford the high cost of studying abroad. To be well educated and accumulate more human capital, 
these Chinese parents and children can merely try their best to earn the highest scores as possible 
on the HET and CET. In this manner, ordinary Chinese could earn the very limited slots in key 
high schools and elite universities. Moreover, a prevailing notion in China is that studying at the 
elite universities is a promising means to promote employment competitiveness in the future 
labor market (Li et al., 2012; Jia and Li, 2016). Therefore, the performances on the HET and CET 
are reasonable indicators of human capital accumulation of children.  
Usually, elite universities in China refer to those financially supported by Project 211 and 
Project 985, initiated by the Chinese government to increase the research standards of high-level 
universities in China. There are 116 universities (nearly 6% of all universities) supported by 
Project 211, among which the best 39 universities are further supported by Project 985. All these 
116 universities are regarded as the elite universities in our study.   
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
In this section, we roughly display the association between household wealth from UHD 
and children’s human capital accumulation in China by presenting descriptive statistics. In Figure 
1, we present the density plot of children’s CET scores of two subgroups from the full sample: 
one subgroup for children who experienced UHD before their CET (UHD children) and the other 
subgroup for children who never experienced UHD (non-UHD children). The vertical axis 
represents CET scores, and the horizontal axis stands for probability density. We clearly observe 
in Figure 1 that the CET score probability density curve of UHD children (solid curve) is on the 
left of that of non-UHD children (dash curve). This observation obviously indicates the relatively 
lower CET scores for UHD children compared with non-UHD children. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis of the negative effect of household wealth from UHD on children’s human 
capital accumulation. Notably, the finding is not a rigorous proof by itself. More detailed 
information and regressions are necessary.   
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Figure 1. Density plot of children’s CET scores 
Notes: The vertical axis represents CET scores and the horizontal axis stands for probability density. The dash 
probability density curve depicts the distribution of CET scores for the non-UHD children, and the solid curve depicts 
for the UHD children who experienced UHD before sitting for the CET. The relative positions of these two curves 
indicate the lower CET scores for UHD children. This finding is in line with the hypothesis of the negative effect of 
household wealth from UHD on children’s human capital accumulation. The information on children’s CET scores is 
from the 2013 CHIP data. 
To set the stage for latter regressions, we first provide more detailed information on the 
descriptive statistics of main variables from the Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS) data in 
Section 3.1. and the 2013 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data in Section 3.2. We 
mainly compare the outcomes of these variables between UHD and non-UHD subgroups to 
demonstrate the basic similarities and differences between these two subgroups and provide some 
preliminary results of the influences of UHD.  
3.1. Data from the Chinese Family Panel Studies 
We use the CFPS data to compare the outcomes of households and individual adults 
before and after UHD, including household wealth condition, individual labor supply, life 
satisfaction and propensity to accumulate children’s human capital. The CFPS data is a nationally 
representative, annual longitudinal survey that has been conducted by the Institute of Social 
Science Survey of Peking University every 2 years since 2010. Due to the availability of 
information on UHD, we employ the CFPS data of only urban households and urban adults from 
25 provinces and the waves of 2012, 2014, and 2016.  
The key variable of our study is the information on UHD. Only in the waves of 2014 and 
2016 is information provided on UHD by asking whether households experienced UHD in the 
past 12 months2. Because the surveys were conducted in 2014 and 2016, we consider that the 
UHD information corresponds to UHD carried out in 2013 and 2015. The wave of 2012 is used to 
 
2 Besides the waves of 2014 and 2016, in the wave of 2010 there is a question to ask whether households 
had ever experienced UHD before, so that we can identify those who had experienced UHD before 2010. 
Among households without UHD in 2013 and 2015, 600 households had experienced UHD before 2010. 
Nevertheless, our results still remain robust if we drop these observations. 
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represent the condition before UHD. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 117 households (1.72%) and 
284 individual adults (1.75%) experienced UHD in 2013, and 148 households (2.14%) and 351 
individual adults (2.19%) experienced UHD in 20153.  
In the subsequent panels of Table 1, each panel pertains to one dimension of our study 
including the related variables. Column (1) comprises means and standard errors (in parentheses) 
of variables for the full sample, and columns (2) and (3) report the corresponding values for the 
samples of UHD households (individuals) and non-UHD households (individuals). We use a 
simple bivariate regression on a dummy variable for UHD households (individuals) to test the 
differences between UHD and non-UHD households (individuals). The results are presented in 
column (4), which comprises regression coefficients (i.e., mean differences between UHD and 
non-UHD groups) and standard errors in parentheses. We also mark the significance levels of 
these differences with stars.  
Panel B and Panel C display outcomes of households and individuals separately before 
UHD, which are not supposed to be affected by whether these households and individuals 
experienced UHD in the following years. In column (4), we find no significant differences in 
number of children; household income; and an individual’s age, gender, and education years. 
However, column (4) does show that houses of UHD households before UHD are significantly 
much older (3.67 years older) than those of non-UHD households, indicating that one of the aims 
of UHD in China is urban renewal that mainly targets demolition and reconstruction of relatively 
older buildings (Zhang and Fang, 2004). Although UHD may not be completely random and is 
 
3 Considering that the observations of UHD households and individuals are much fewer than those without 
UHD, we also conduct all the regressions again in which we match every UHD household and individual to 
those without UHD but having the same family size and children number, and at the same age level and 
education level, and in the same province. In this way, we compare 265 UHD households (635 UHD 
individuals) in the waves of 2014 and 2016 with 2766 non-UHD households (8304 non-UHD individuals). 
Therefore, the share of UHD households in total households increases from 1.97% (before matching) to 
9.58% (after matching), and the share of UHD individuals in total individuals increases from 2.01% (before 
matching) to 7.63% (after matching). Our conclusions hold whether we do matching or not. 
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inevitably affected by household characteristics including house age and family size, we can 
include household or individual fixed effects in our regression equations to address this concern 
by using panel data and the DID approach.  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the CFPS data 
 Full sample 
 
(1) 
UHD 
 
(2) 
Non-UHD 
 
(3) 
Mean 
differences 
(4) 
Panel A:  sample size     
Wave of 2012     
Households 6050    
Adults 15215    
Wave of 2014 (UHD information from 2013)     
Households 6789 117 6672  
Adults 16230 284 15946  
Wave of 2016 (UHD information from 2015)     
Households 6901 148 6753  
Adults 16009 351 15658  
     
Panel B: predetermined outcomes at household 
level 
    
Family size 3.5104 
(1.6038) 
3.6766 
(1.7925) 
3.5017 
(1.5931) 
0.1748* 
(0.0945) 
Children number 0.5227 
(0.7424) 
0.5182 
(0.7495) 
0.5229 
(0.7421) 
-0.0047 
(0.0438) 
Income 54528.99 
(86053.83) 
50813.07 
(49998.36) 
54730.5 
(87584.36) 
-3917.429 
(5243.195) 
House age 13.1834 
(10.4783) 
16.6763 
(11.7736) 
13.0105 
(10.3811) 
3.6658*** 
(0.7441) 
     
Panel C: predetermined outcomes at individual 
level 
    
Age 45.1474 
(16.8801) 
45.7330 
(16.6955) 
45.1205 
(16.8886) 
0.6125 
（0.6630） 
Gender (1=male, 0= female) 0.4822 
(0.4997) 
0.4779 
(0.4999) 
0.4824 
(0.4997) 
-0.0045 
（0.0196） 
Education years 8.1419 
(4.8603) 
8.0164 
(4.5394) 
8.1476 
(4.8745) 
-0.1312 
（0.1917） 
     
Panel D: household wealth condition     
House number     
Before UHD 1.1932 
(0.4733) 
1.2440 
(0.4930) 
1.1908 
(0.4723) 
0.0532 
(0.0335) 
After UHD 1.2606 
(0.5545) 
1.4922 
(0.8173) 
1.2509 
(0.5387) 
0.2414*** 
(0.0406) 
House value, in RMB 10,000     
Before UHD 48.7092 
(82.3207) 
49.9338 
(69.2859) 
48.6513 
(82.8920) 
1.2824 
(5.8418) 
After UHD 94.2893 
(490.7659) 
303.8779 
(2176.093) 
85.5355 
(228.4923) 
218.3423*** 
(36.0158) 
Cash and bank deposits, in RMB 10,000     
Before UHD 4.2141 
(12.8740) 
3.3649 
(7.8933) 
4.2579 
(13.0785) 
-0.8929 
(0.7975) 
After UHD 6.6598 10.9055 6.4174 4.4881*** 
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(19.1515) (34.6408) (17.8414) (1.0437) 
     
Panel E: individual labor supply (1=employed, 
0=unemployed) 
    
Before UHD 0.5883 
(0.4922) 
0.5914 
(0.4919) 
0.5882 
(0.4922) 
0.0033 
(0.0193) 
After UHD 0.6450 
(0.4785) 
0.5540 
(0.4974) 
0.6496 
(0.4771) 
-0.0956*** 
(0.0176) 
     
Panel F: life satisfaction, from 1 (strongly 
unsatisfied) to 5 (strongly satisfied) 
    
Before UHD 3.3500 
(1.0404) 
3.4550 
(1.0283) 
3.3449 
(1.0408) 
0.1100*** 
(0.0413) 
After UHD 3.6216 
(1.0591) 
3.7533 
(1.0240) 
3.6152 
(1.0603) 
0.1381*** 
(0.0396) 
     
Panel G: propensity to accumulate children’s 
human capital 
    
Hours to tutor children for homework weekly     
Before UHD 6.4671 
(5.4940) 
6.7857 
(6.3334) 
6.4571 
(5.4680) 
0.3287 
(0.8612) 
After UHD 7.2460 
(5.6261) 
6.9182 
(5.0468) 
7.2601 
(5.6512) 
-0.3420 
(0.7751) 
Expect that children achieve at least a 
bachelor’s degree (1=yes, 0=no) 
    
Before UHD 0.8976 
(0.3033) 
0.9123 
(0.2854) 
0.8970 
(0.3041) 
0.0153 
(0.0410) 
After UHD 0.8414 
(0.3653) 
0.7857 
(0.4122) 
0.8434 
(0.3635) 
-0.0577 
(0.0351) 
Notes. Descriptive statistics for the main variables employed are from the CFPS data. The sample comprises all urban 
households and urban individuals in the waves of 2012, 2014, and 2016 across 25 provinces in China. Panel A reports 
the sample size of each subgroup. The subsequent panels display means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of 
variables of different subgroups in columns (1), (2), and (3). Column (4) presents the results of a bivariate regression on 
a dummy for UHD groups including coefficients (i.e., mean differences between UHD and non-UHD groups) and 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * mean that differences are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
The remainder of Table 1 shows the results of comparisons at two folds, namely, 
differences between UHD and non-UHD groups, and changes from the pre-UHD to post-UHD 
era. These comparisons illustrate that the differences between UHD and non-UHD groups are 
driven by UHD per se rather than only the other confounding factors related to UHD. Panel D 
reports the wealth condition of UHD and non-UHD households and corresponding changes after 
UHD. We observe that before UHD, there are no significant differences in household wealth 
condition between UHD and non-UHD households in terms of house number, house value, and 
cash and bank deposits. However, after UHD, UHD households compared with non-UHD 
households have significantly more houses (0.24 in number and RMB 2,183,423 in value) and 
more cash and bank deposits (RMB 44,881 in value). This finding suggests UHD could result in 
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substantial wealth growth for affected households, but the results are rough and do not include 
more control variables. 
The outcomes regarding individual labor supply and life satisfaction are displayed in 
Panels E and F. We use a dummy variable for employed individuals, 1 for being employed and 0 
for being unemployed, to measure labor supply in the extensive margin. Life satisfaction is 
reported by respondents on a scale, from 1 (strongly unsatisfied) to 5 (strongly satisfied). Labor 
supply does not differ between UHD and non-UHD individuals before UHD, and labor supply of 
UHD individuals displays a significant decrease relative to non-UHD individuals after UHD. This 
significant change implies the negative effect of UHD on individual labor supply. Although life 
satisfaction of UHD individuals is significantly higher than that of non-UHD individuals, before 
or after UHD, this gap increases further after UHD, suggesting the positive effect of UHD on 
individual life satisfaction.  
 
Figure 2. Time profiles of employment rates in relation to the timing of UHD 
Notes: The full sample of individual adults is divided into three subgroups, non-UHD, UHD in 2013, and UHD in 
2015. The horizontal axis stands for years and the vertical axis depicts employment rates by the formula (number of 
being employed divided by subsample size). The employment rates of UHD subgroups start to decrease, whereas that 
of non-UHD subgroup continues to increase, implying the negative effect of UHD on individual labor supply. The 
information on individual status of employment is from the CFPS data.   
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Our explanation of the negative effect of household wealth from UHD on children’s 
human capital accumulation connects the decline in individual adults’ labor supply induced by 
UHD to human capital accumulation. Therefore, more detailed evidence is desirable on whether 
labor supply or working status, that is, being employed or unemployed, actually varies with the 
timing of UHD and whether the pattern differs between UHD and non-UHD individuals. With the 
available information, we trace out time-series profiles of employment rates of different 
subgroups with respect to UHD (Figure 2). The full sample of individual adults is divided into 
three subgroups: non-UHD, UHD in 2013, and UHD in 2015. Figure 2 plots time profiles of 
employment rates of these three subgroups, separately, where the horizontal axis stands for years 
and the vertical axis depicts employment rates by the formula (number of being employed divided 
by subsample size). The employment rate for non-UHD individuals continues to increase, but it 
starts to decrease for UHD subgroups only in the post-UHD era, suggesting that some of the 
UHD individuals give up their jobs after experiencing UHD. This finding thus implies the 
negative effect of UHD on labor supply.   
Panel G summarizes the differences between the UHD and non-UHD groups and changes 
over time of adults’ propensity to accumulate children’s human capital. Due to the limitation of 
the CFPS data, we can only observe the changes in propensity to invest in children’s human 
capital. Direct outcomes of children’s human capital accumulation, such as educational 
achievement of children measured by CET and HET scores, are not available in this dataset. 
Hence, we use two variables to indicate propensity to accumulate children’s human capital: hours 
to tutor children’s homework weekly and a dummy variable for the expectation that their children 
achieve at least a bachelor’s degree. Although the differences between UHD and non-UHD 
concerning these two variables are not significant, we observe the changes from the pre-UHD to 
post -UHD era. UHD adults have slightly more hours to tutor children and a higher probability to 
expect that their children achieve at least a bachelor’s degree before UHD. However, after UHD, 
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the values of these two variables are lower for UHD adults than non-UHD adults. These changes 
imply the relative decline in the propensity to accumulate their children’s human capital for UHD 
adults after experiencing UHD.  
3.2. Data on children’s educational achievement 
Hoekstra et al. (2018) estimate the cognitive returns to high school quality by using the 
CET scores of children in China. Following this way, we exploit the performance of children on 
the CET and HET to estimate the effect of UHD on children’s educational achievement. Given 
the vital significance of HET and CET for Chinese children (Lu et al., 2018; Hoekstra et al., 
2018), children’s educational achievement measured by their performance on the CET and HET 
is an ideal indicator of their human capital accumulation. Data from the 2013 CHIP, a national 
cross-sectional survey of Chinese households, provides information on UHD, CET, and HET. 
Our sample comprises all urban children, that is, sons or daughters of household heads in the 
urban sample. This supplement is key to the analysis of the changes in adults’ propensity to 
accumulate their children’s human capital after experiencing UHD. Specifically, the UHD 
information is about whether and which year households that children belong to experienced 
UHD. CET information mainly records which year children sat for the CET, their CET scores, 
and whether they entered elite universities. HET information documents only whether children 
entered key high schools. HET scores are not available in this dataset. We define children who 
experienced UHD before they sat for the CET or HET as UHD children because only in this 
manner could UHD possibly affect their CET or HET performance. Non-UHD children are those 
who did not experience UHD before the survey was conducted. Due to the lack of information on 
which year the children sat for the HET, we calculate it by their birth years based on the 
assumption that usually children sit for the HET at age 16 years, considering that Chinese 
children generally begin elementary schools at age 7 years and spend 6 years in elementary 
school and 3 years in middle school.  
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of children’s CET and HET performance from the CHIP data 
 Full sample 
(1) 
UHD 
(2)  
Non-UHD 
(3) 
Mean differences 
(4) 
CET scores 461.5977 
（92.8481） 
441.0189 
（86.7713） 
464.0466 
（92.3538） 
-23.0278** 
（9.3076） 
Enter elite universities 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
0.1655 
（0.3718） 
0.0659 
（0.2495） 
0.1759 
（0.3809） 
-0.1099*** 
（0.0407） 
Enter key high schools  
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
0.4645 
（0.4988） 
0.3384 
（0.4744） 
0.4847 
（0.4999） 
-0.1463*** 
（0.0369） 
Notes. Descriptive statistics of children’s CET and HET performance are from the 2013 CHIP data. Means and 
standard deviations (in parentheses) of variables of different subgroups are displayed in columns (1), (2), and (3). 
Column (4) presents the results of a bivariate regression on a dummy for UHD groups including coefficients (i.e., mean 
differences between UHD and non-UHD groups) and standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * mean that 
differences are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Table 2 reports the educational outcomes of UHD children and non-UHD children. 
Column (1) displays means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of performance on the CET 
and HET for the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) present the corresponding values for UHD and 
non-UHD children, respectively. Column (4) reports the results of bivariate regression on a 
dummy variable for UHD children including coefficients (i.e., mean differences between UHD 
children and non-UHD children) and standard errors in parentheses. Obviously, significant gaps 
are observed in CET and HET performance between UHD children and non-UHD children 
consistent with the illustration of Figure 1. On average, for non-UHD children, CET scores are 
464.05 points, the probability of entering elite universities is 17.59%, and the probability of 
entering key high schools is 48.47%. Compared with non-UHD children, UHD children score 
23.03 points less on the CET, and are much less likely to enter elite universities (i.e., 10.99 
percentage points less) and key high schools (i.e., 14.63 percentage points less). These descriptive 
statistics could provide approximate insights into the profound consequences of UHD for 
children’s educational achievement, implying the relative reduction of human capital 
accumulation for those children affected by UHD.  
20 
 
4. Estimation strategy 
UHD may not be completely randomized and is related to family size and house age 
(Panel B of Table 1), because of the aim of Chinese UHD. Therefore, the main empirical 
challenge of our study is to identify the pure effects of UHD by distinguishing the effects of UHD 
from other confounding factors such as individual and household characteristics.  
For the panel data from the CFPS, we use the DID approach to capture the differences 
between UHD group and non-UHD group (first difference) and the changes within groups from 
the pre-UHD to post-UHD era (second difference). Thereby, we can control for time-constant 
confounding factors at the individual or household level such as house age by including 
individual or household fixed effects in regressions. This DID approach also enables us to include 
province-year fixed effects, which can effectively control for all time-varying differences across 
provinces such as economic policies associated with both UHD and economic growth.  
We implement the DID approach at the household level in regression equation (1): 
,                           (1) 
where yht is three measures of the wealth condition of household h in year t including number of 
houses, value of these houses, and amount of cash and bank deposits. Our key regressor is the 
DID term, which is an interaction of two dummy variables: one dummy for UHD households, 
namely, households that have experienced UHD, and one dummy for the post-UHD era. The 
coefficient of interest is the estimate on this DID term, β, which measures the extra wealth 
changes of UHD households in the post-UHD era relative to non-UHD households. β is supposed 
to be significantly positive if Chinese UHD households obtain significant wealth growth thanks to 
UHD compensation. The vectors μh and μpt are full sets of household and province-year fixed 
effects to control for household-specific time-invariant factors and province-specific time-varying 
factors. Xht is the control variables, both time-varying and household-specific, containing family 
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size, number of children in the household, household head age, and its squared term. To address 
the potential dynamic effects of time-invariant variables at the household level, we also 
incorporate the interactions of the variable Xh and year dummy variables in the regression 
equations. In this part, Xh is only education years of household head, which may have differential 
effects on household wealth condition in different years with various economic climates. εht is the 
error term. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are clustered over the household level.  
We estimate a similar regression equation at the individual adult level concerning the 
individual labor supply in the extensive margin and individual life satisfaction by employing the 
DID approach as follows: 
 ,                       (2) 
where yiht is two outcomes of individual i from household h in year t. Dependent variables at the 
individual level contain a dummy variable for being employed and a variable on a 5-point scale 
for life satisfaction, 1 (strongly unsatisfied) to 5 (strongly satisfied). These two variables are used 
to examine the effects of UHD on individuals’ labor supply and life satisfaction. The key 
regressor, the DID term, is the same as that in equation (1). Individual fixed effects μi and 
province-year fixed effects μpt are also included in regression equations to control for confounding 
factors. Time-varying control variable Xiht includes family size and number of children in the 
household h where individual i is from, age, and its squared term of individual i in year t. Time-
invariant variable Xih, which may have dynamic effects, is an individual’s education years and 
gender. εiht is the error term. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are clustered over the 
household level. 
Our regression equation for adults’ propensity to accumulate their children’s human 
capital is slightly different from equation (2) as follows: 
,                   (3)               
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where yicht is the propensity of individual i and household h to accumulate human capital of child 
c, which is indicated by hours spent weekly tutoring child c for homework completion and a 
dummy variable for the expectation that child c would obtain at least a bachelor’s degree. In this 
part of the survey, individual i refers to the adult member of household h who answers these 
children-related questions. Children fixed effects μc are included in addition to province-year 
fixed effects μpt to control for confounding factors. Time-varying control variable Xicht includes 
family size and number of children in household h where child c and individual i are from, age, 
and its squared term of individual i and child c in year t. Time-invariant variable Xich, which 
interacts with year dummy variables, includes gender (1 for male, 0 for female) and education 
years of individual i, and gender (1 for boys, 0 for girls) of child c. εicht is the error term. Standard 
errors of estimated coefficients are clustered at the household level. 
We further exploit the outcomes of children’s human capital accumulation measured by 
their educational achievement, namely, the performance of children on the CET and HET. These 
are two most important exams for Chinese as studying at elite universities would help them 
obtain a much higher wage (Li et al., 2012; Jia and Li, 2016). Cross-sectional data from the 2013 
CHIP provides information on households’ UHD, and children’s performance on the CET and 
HET. Although CET is a nationwide standardized examination, the competition in the CET is 
among the children from the same province because each province has an independent CET 
admissions procedure and admission rate (Lu et al., 2018), based on the differences in population, 
education development level, textbooks, and test papers across provinces. Moreover, the two 
main test categories of the CET are the nature science category and the social science category, 
which children choose based on their talent and interest. For the nature science category, the 
comprehensive subject exam assesses physics, chemistry, and biology. For the social science 
category, the comprehensive subject exam assesses political science, history, and geography. 
Except for differences in the comprehensive subjects, the test of mathematics is more difficult for 
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the nature science category. In addition, the difficulty of the exam varies by years. Thus, CET 
performance is only comparable within the same province, test category, and test year. 
Correspondingly, we add full sets of fixed effects of test province, test category, and test year in 
the regression equations.  
Our regression specification for children’s performance on the CET is then: 
,                                                                (4) 
where ych is the CET performance of child c from household h indicated by her/his CET score and 
a dummy variable for entering an elite university. Our regressor of interest, the dummy variable 
of UHDh, equals 1 if child c sat for the CET after her/his household h experienced UHD, and 
equals 0 if household h has never experienced UHD before the survey was conducted. Control 
variable Xch includes gender (1 for boys, 0 for girls) and nationality (Han or not) of child c as well 
as family size, number of children, and education years of head of household h where child c is 
from. μp, μcategory, and μt are fixed effects of test province, test category, and test year, respectively. 
εch is the error term. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are clustered over the province 
level. 
Unlike the CET, in which competition is restricted to the same province, the HET is 
usually organized at the city level and children mainly compete with peers from the same city, as 
investigated in Hoekstra et al. (2018). In reality, the HET and high school admission process are 
commonly organized at the county level in some regions as well. Therefore, for the robustness of 
our results, we estimate the results with city or county fixed effects. Moreover, compared with the 
binary choice of nature or social science category before sitting for the CET, on the HET, every 
child is assessed on the same subjects; thus, there is no test category fixed effect in the regression 
equation of HET performance. 
We estimate a similar version of equation (4) as equation (5): 
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 ,                                                                     (5) 
where ych is the performance on the HET of child c from household h measured by a dummy 
variable for entering a key high school. The key explanatory variable, UHDh, is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if child c sat for the HET after household h experienced UHD and 0 if household h 
never experienced UHD. μcity/county is the test city or county fixed effects, and μt is the test year 
fixed effects. Control variable Xch is the same as those in equation (4). εch is the error term. 
Standard errors of estimated coefficients are clustered over the city or county level. 
However, for the cross-sectional data from the 2013 CHIP, we can no longer implement 
the DID approach to control for household-specific underlying characteristics, for example, 
parent’s ability, ambition, and habit which are unobservable but could be passed to their children 
and thereby determine children’s educational achievement. As households with relatively older 
houses and larger family sizes are more likely to be the target of UHD (Panel B of Table 1), 
controlling for other potential differences between UHD and non-UHD households is necessary. 
To address this concern, we conduct a placebo test by comparing the subsample who experienced 
UHD after sitting for the CET or HET to those who never experienced UHD. Specifically, we 
define a placebo variable, UHDh
placebo, which is a dummy variable, 1 for those that experienced 
UHD after sitting for the CET or HET and 0 for those that never experienced UHD. In this 
specification, UHD per se can no longer affect children’s performance on the CET or HET 
because UHD occurred after the CET or HET. Hence, we expect UHDh
placebo to cast relatively 
much smaller effects on the outcomes of children’s educational achievement than UHDh in 
equations (4) and (5), or even zero effects. Otherwise, it indicates that the confounding factors 
related to UHD instead of UHD per se produce these outcomes. The regression equations of the 
placebo test for the performance of children on the CET and HET are similar to equations (4) and 
(5), except the independent variable of UHDh is replaced by UHDh
placebo. 
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Furthermore, we exploit the case of Chinese UHD to examine the effects of UHD on 
outcomes of households, adults, and children involving various individual hypotheses. In this 
situation of multiple hypotheses, a true null hypothesis has a potentially large probability of being 
rejected, leading to false positives. To address this concern, we follow Romano and Wolf 
(2005a,b, 2016) to jointly test these hypotheses and produce Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values to 
control the family-wise error rate.  
5. Empirical findings 
The regression results are presented in detail in this section. First, the key assumption 
underlying the association between household wealth from UHD and children’s human capital 
accumulation is that UHD could result in significant wealth growth for UHD households and 
consequently, reduce labor supply of individual adults affected by UHD. We searched for 
evidence in this regard in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Second, due to the decline in labor supply of UHD 
individual adults, it is not necessary anymore and therefore less motivated to invest in the human 
capital of the adults and their children only for the promotion of competitiveness in the labor 
market. This would reduce UHD adults’ propensity to accumulate the human capital of their 
children and eventually lead to lower educational achievement of children. The related evidence 
is displayed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Third, for the panel data from the CFPS, we use individual or 
household fixed effects to control for the individual or household-related confounding factors. 
For the cross-sectional data from the 2013 CHIP, placebo tests are implemented to examine and 
rule out the potential effects of these confounding factors.  
5.1. Household wealth condition 
The regression results for the effect of UHD on household wealth condition are reported 
in Table 3. The first three regressions are performed on the full sample at the household level 
concerning number of houses they own, market value of those houses as evaluated by 
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respondents, and their cash and bank deposits. These three dependent variables are three key 
dimensions of household wealth condition. All these regressions confirm the same patterns, that 
is, UHD increases household wealth, which is both economically large and statistically 
significant. More specifically, we find that UHD has a strongly positive effect on household 
wealth condition (with a point estimate of 0.22 for house number, 275.72 for house value, and 
11.82 for cash and bank deposits all at the 1 percent level). The meanings of point estimates are 
that compared with non-UHD households, UHD households could have more houses (0.22 in 
number), more expensive houses (RMB 2,757,211 in value), and more cash and bank deposits 
(RMB 118,246 in value) after experiencing UHD. The total wealth growth resulting from UHD is 
RMB 2,875,457 (i.e., the increase of house value plus the increase of cash and bank deposits). 
Since the per capita Chinese disposable income in 2016 was only RMB 23,821, according to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, the wealth increase induced by UHD is considerable for 
affected households. This could be a huge shock that potentially alters household members’ 
behavior regarding labor supply and human capital accumulation.  
Table 3 
Household wealth condition 
Variables  House 
number 
 
House value 
(in RMB 
10,000)  
Cash and 
bank 
deposits 
(in RMB 
10,000)  
 House value 
(in RMB 10,000)  
 
 Cash and bank deposits 
(in RMB 10,000)  
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
 Full sample  Bottom and 
top 1% are 
excluded. 
Bottom and 
top 5% are 
excluded. 
 Bottom 
and top 
1% are 
excluded. 
Bottom 
and top 
5% are 
excluded. 
UHD×post 0.2182*** 
(0.0467) 
[0.0000] 
275.7211*** 
(54.4768) 
[0.0000] 
11.8246*** 
(1.2744) 
[0.0000] 
 27.6241*** 
(8.6652) 
[0.0000] 
36.7075*** 
(6.5485) 
[0.0000] 
 7.1588*** 
(1.0472) 
[0.0000] 
8.9485*** 
(0.7951) 
[0.0000] 
Family size 0.0902*** 
(0.0072) 
10.8845 
(8.3189) 
0.7562*** 
(0.2420) 
 7.4979*** 
(0.9036) 
5.2063*** 
(0.7225) 
 0.5245*** 
(0.1490) 
0.2681** 
(0.1170) 
Children 
number 
-0.0054 
(0.0144) 
-5.1114 
(16.7526) 
-0.4403 
(0.4774) 
 -3.2083* 
(1.7708) 
0.2556 
(1.4014) 
 -0.0301 
(0.2941) 
-0.0242 
(0.2283) 
Age 0.0001 
(0.0036) 
-2.2732 
(4.1590) 
-0.2653** 
(0.1164) 
 -0.0886 
(0.4351) 
0.1699 
(0.3433) 
 -0.1845** 
(0.0722) 
-0.0201 
(0.0573) 
Squared age  -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0026 
(0.0401) 
0.0026** 
(0.0011) 
 -0.0007 
(0.0042) 
-0.0024 
(0.0033) 
 0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
0.0001 
(0.0006) 
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Education 
years × year 
2014 
0.0022 
(0.0023) 
0.8026 
(2.6719) 
-0.0144 
(0.0803) 
 0.2760 
(0.2812) 
0.3181 
(0.2241) 
 0.0752 
(0.0493) 
0.0430 
(0.0382) 
Education 
years ×  year 
2016 
0.0030 
(0.0022) 
0.3603 
(2.5667) 
0.2953*** 
(0.0696) 
 1.4081*** 
(0.2708) 
0.9827*** 
(0.2163) 
 0.1994*** 
(0.0431) 
0.0565* 
(0.0343) 
Household 
fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Province-
year fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 13400 13356 12876  12935 11755  12623 11443 
R2 0.0595 0.0225 0.0942  0.2598 0.2892  0.1154 0.1395 
Notes. Regressions are based on the CFPS data. Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering over 
the household. Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values in square brackets are produced for multiple hypotheses of the effects 
of UHD. First three columns are tested jointly, columns (4) and (6) are tested jointly, and columns (5) and (7) are tested 
jointly. ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
However, as Ho (2013a) describes, the distribution of UHD compensation may not be 
equitable; thus, extreme points (i.e., outliers) would largely influence our regression results. To 
make our results more representative and robust, we conduct a sequence of additional regressions 
where potential outliers are removed. In the last four columns of Table 3, we remove a small 
number of households whose reported house value or cash and bank deposits are in the bottom or 
top 1% or 5%. The same qualitative patterns are preserved, but the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients become smaller, especially for house value. However, even based on the smallest 
coefficients, RMB 347,829 (i.e., RMB 276,241 of house value increase in column [4] plus RMB 
71,588 of cash and bank deposits increase in column [7]) is substantial wealth growth for UHD 
households. Afterward, this wealth growth almost equals 15 years of individual income in China. 
For the concern of false positives, we calculate and report the Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values 
of the DID interactions between UHD and post in square brackets. Specifically, the regressions in 
the first three columns are tested jointly, columns (4) and (6) are tested jointly and columns (5) 
and (7) are tested jointly. Regardless of the regular p-values or Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values, 
all the effects of UHD on household wealth condition are highly significant.  
5.2. Individual labor supply and life satisfaction 
Since the effect of UHD on household wealth growth is clear, we then turn to the 
evidence of the changes in individual labor supply in the extensive margin over time and their 
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relationship with UHD. It is informative about the wealth effect on labor supply to exploit the 
case of UHD in China, which is an ideal means to overcome the problems in the estimation of 
labor supply elasticities discussed in Keane (2011) and Picchio et al. (2017). In line with the 
illustration of Figure 2, our regression results confirm the negative effect of UHD on individual 
labor supply with more detailed information. Focusing on the result from the full sample, with 
full sets of control variables, the magnitude of the effect is -0.0377 as shown in column (1) of 
Table 4, which implies that if an adult is from a UHD household, she/he would have a 3.77 
percentage point higher probability of giving up their job and being unemployed in the post-UHD 
era than non-UHD individuals.  
In addition, considering the mandatory retirement age in China (60 for men and 55 for 
women), we further restrict the full sample to men aged 22 to 60 and women aged 22 to 55. 
Based on the comparison of coefficients of DID terms shown in columns (3) and (5), we find that 
women are much more likely to reduce their labor supply by becoming unemployed than men 
after experiencing UHD (8.79 percentage points for women vs. 1.48 percentage points for men). 
Moreover, the effect of UHD on labor supply for men in column (3) is not significant, whereas 
that for women in column (5) is significant at the 5% level. This result reveals a traditional social 
norm in China may work that men go outside the home to work while women work at home by 
performing household chores (Chen and Ge, 2018). Furthermore, it echoes the study of Fu et al. 
(2016), who find that wealth from housing price appreciation in China decreases women’s labor 
supply but has little influence on that of men.  
Although we could regard UHD in China as a positive event in terms of household 
wealth growth (Section 5.1.), some studies have depicted the misery and suffering originating 
from the experiences of unmaking and remaking a home (Zhang, 2018) and forced evictions (Ho, 
2013b) caused by Chinese UHD. If this phenomenon is widespread, the case might be that the 
aforementioned misery and suffering force UHD individuals to give up their jobs instead of the 
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wealth effect of UHD on labor supply. To check this possibility, we further examine whether 
UHD reduces individual life satisfaction, as has been described in some literature (Zhang, 2018; 
Ho, 2013b). Unlike the results of the field research with relatively smaller sample sizes in Zhang 
(2018) and Ho (2013a,b), our regression result based on the nationally large sample shows UHD, 
by contrast, significantly increases individual life satisfaction for the full sample in column (2) of 
Table 4. Columns (4) and (6) indicate women tend to have greater increases in life satisfaction 
than men after experiencing UHD, although the regression results are not significant. Moreover, 
in line with our finding, Li and Song (2009) document that UHD in China substantially improves 
housing condition and dwelling satisfaction. Therefore, this additional evidence could mitigate 
the concern.  
Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values are also presented in square brackets. The variables in 
columns (1) and (2) are tested jointly, and the last four columns are tested jointly. The 
significance of the effects of the DID term (UHD×post) does not change under these adjusted p-
values, which mitigates the concern of false positives.  
Table 4 
Individual adult labor supply and life satisfaction  
Variables  Employed 
 
Life 
satisfaction 
 Employed 
  
Life 
satisfaction 
 Employed 
  
Life 
satisfaction 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Full sample  Men aged 22 to 60  Women aged 22 to 55 
UHD×post -0.0377* 
(0.0186) 
[0.0693] 
0.0826* 
(0.0520) 
[0.0990] 
 -0.0148 
(0.0281) 
[0.7426] 
0.0634 
(0.0918) 
[0.7426] 
 -0.0879** 
(0.0368) 
[0.0396] 
0.1371 
(0.0936) 
[0.3762] 
Family size -0.0078*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0026 
(0.0080) 
 -0.0065 
(0.0043) 
0.0098 
(0.0146) 
 -0.0080 
(0.0056) 
-0.0122 
(0.0147) 
Children 
number 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0129 
(0.0150) 
 0.0023 
(0.0077) 
0.0082 
(0.0257) 
 -0.0438*** 
(0.0099) 
0.0381 
(0.0255) 
Age 0.1003*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.1277*** 
(0.0297) 
 0.1059*** 
(0.0160) 
-0.1263** 
(0.0539) 
 0.1253*** 
(0.0226) 
-0.1300** 
(0.0600) 
Squared age -0.0008*** 
(0.00003) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
 -0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 -0.0013*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
Education 
years × year 
2014 
0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0047* 
(0.0024) 
 0.0004 
(0.0016) 
-0.0091* 
(0.0052) 
 0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0136*** 
(0.0048) 
Education 
years ×  year 
2016 
0.0003 
(0.0009) 
-0.0092*** 
(0.0026) 
 -0.0019 
(0.0014) 
0.0005 
(0.0046) 
 0.00001 
(0.0018) 
-0.0111** 
(0.0046) 
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Male × year 
2014 
0.0201** 
(0.0080) 
0.0456** 
(0.0227) 
      
Male × year 
2016 
0.0078 
(0.0082) 
-0.0144 
(0.0229) 
      
Individual 
fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Province-
year fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 46558 44294  16236 15342  14881 14310 
R2 0.0473 0.0855  0.0531 0.1038  0.0440 0.0941 
Notes. Regressions are based on the CFPS data. For the variable employed, 1 is for being employed and 0 is for being 
unemployed. Life satisfaction is measured on a 5-point scale, 1 (strongly unsatisfied) to 5 (strongly satisfied). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering over the household. Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values in 
square brackets are produced for multiple hypotheses of the effects of UHD. The first two columns are tested jointly, 
and the last four columns are tested jointly. ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
5.3. Propensity to accumulate children’s human capital 
In this section, we focus on the effect of UHD on adults’ propensity to accumulate their 
children’s human capital. It is already significant in the former sections that wealth growth from 
UHD has a negative influence on the labor supply of adults. In this respect, a rational act is for 
UHD adults to reduce their propensity to invest in the human capital of their children. This 
hypothesis is supported by the evidence shown in Table 5. For the regression results of the full 
sample in columns (1) and (2), first, UHD adults spend on average relatively less weekly hours in 
tutoring their children for homework completion (1.88 hours less) after experiencing UHD4; 
second, UHD adults have lower educational expectations for their children in the post-UHD era, 
that is, a 13.01 percentage point lower probability of expecting that their children obtain at least a 
bachelor’s degree. Usually, Chinese children start elementary schools at age 6 or 7 years, and 
only after that will they have adequate homework that requires tutorship from adults. In this way, 
we further analyze the subsample that excludes children younger than 6 years old who may not 
need tutorship. The magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficient of UHD×post are 
much larger in column (3) than that of the full sample in column (1). The variables in columns (1) 
 
4 Moreover, there is another possibility that due to their improved ability to pay, UHD households may 
increase other investment on children’s human capital to offset the decline in tutoring hours. But we do not 
find enough evidence to support this point, that is, UHD households do not significantly increase their 
savings for children’s education.  
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and (2) are jointly tested, and the Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values are reported in square 
brackets.  
Table 5 
Adults’ propensity to accumulate their children’s human capital 
Variables  Tutoring hours Educational 
expectation 
 Tutoring hours 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 Full sample  Children aged 
younger than 6 years 
are excluded. 
UHD×post -1.8829 
(1.3769) 
[0.1881] 
-0.1301** 
(0.0614) 
[0.0495] 
 -3.3953** 
(1.6366) 
 
Family size 0.4153** 
(0.2089) 
-0.0020 
(0.0086) 
 0.4262 
(0.2797) 
Children number -0.1534 
(0.4002) 
-0.0053 
(0.0172) 
 -0.0073 
(0.5281) 
Adult age -0.1122 
(0.0992) 
-0.0079* 
(0.0044) 
 -0.1196 
(0.1375) 
Adult squared age 0.0010 
(0.0011) 
0.0001** 
(0.00005) 
 0.0010 
(0.0014) 
Child age  0.4002 
(0.8959) 
-0.0329 
(0.0312) 
 -1.1107 
(1.2365) 
Child squared age -0.1202*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
 -0.0833*** 
(0.0245) 
Adult education 
years × year 2014 
-0.0076 
(0.0609) 
0.0064** 
(0.0027) 
 -0.0242 
(0.0697) 
Adult education 
years ×  year 2016 
0.1846*** 
(0.0598) 
0.0042* 
(0.0026) 
 0.1794** 
(0.0726) 
Male × year 2014 1.2497** 
(0.4829) 
-0.0552** 
(0.0216) 
 0.8557 
(0.6087) 
Male × year 2016 0.1692 
(0.5473) 
-0.0140 
(0.0228) 
 -0.1125 
(0.6715) 
Boy × year 2014 0.0444 
(0.4864) 
-0.0093 
(0.0258) 
 0.3790 
(0.6029) 
Boy × year 2016 0.7687 
(0.5576) 
-0.0133 
(0.0270) 
 0.8037 
(0.7404) 
Individual fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Province-year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 4119 7438  3272 
R2 0.1144 0.0551  0.1022 
Notes. Regressions are based on the CFPS data. For the variable of educational expectation, 1 is for expecting that their 
children obtain at least a bachelor’s degree and 0 is for not. Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by 
clustering over the household. Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values in square brackets are produced for multiple 
hypotheses of the effects of UHD. First two columns are tested jointly. ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
5.4. Children’s educational achievement 
Finally, we examine educational achievement indicators by children, namely, their 
performance on the CET and HET, the two most important tests in their childhood. In our 
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explanation, the reduction of the propensity for adults to accumulate the human capital of their 
children, which is induced by UHD, could be eventually embodied in children’s educational 
achievement. First, we look at the outcomes of CET performance. Column (1) of Table 6 relates 
children’s CET scores to their UHD experiences and other determinants. We find that UHD 
experiences have a strongly negative effect on CET scores (with a point estimate of -15.33 on the 
dummy variable of UHD, which is statistically significant). This finding means that compared 
with children who never experienced UHD, children who experienced UHD before sitting for the 
CET, score 15.33 points lower. The differences in CET scores between UHD and non-UHD 
children are economically large. Notably, a 1-year increase in education for household heads 
increases CET scores by 3.63 points. The effect on the probability of entering elite universities 
presents the same pattern. The parameter estimate of -0.0956 in column (2) implies that UHD 
experiences reduce the probability of entering elite universities by 9.56 percentage points. By 
comparison, a 1-year increase in household heads’ education only increases this probability by 
1.53 percentage points, indicating the economic significance of UHD experiences’ effect.  
Concerned by the noise from possible outliers, we further conduct additional regressions 
in which observations with extreme CET scores are removed through three different filters. In 
columns (3) and (4), we take out a small number of children whose reported CET scores are in 
the bottom or top 1%. In columns (5) and (6), observations with bottom or top 5% CET scores are 
excluded. Additionally, we remove the observations with CET scores lower than 200 points or 
higher than 700 points, scores that seem too low or too high to be realistic, possibly owing to 
misreporting by respondents. In all cases, we observe the same patterns: UHD experiences before 
CET significantly decrease CET performance of children including their CET scores and the 
probability of entering elite universities. In fact, the point estimate of UHD experiences and its 
significance are moderately larger for the cases without possible outliers. The variables of 
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columns (1) and (2) are jointly tested, and the same for columns (3) and (4), columns (5) and (6), 
and columns (7) and (8). The Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values are reported in square brackets. 
Second, we turn to the outcomes of HET performance. In particular, we examine the 
differences in the probability of entering key high schools, which is a reasonable indicator of 
HET performance. Table 7 displays the regression results. In column (1), under the assumption of 
sitting for the HET at age 15 years and with HET city fixed effects, children who experienced 
UHD before sitting for the HET exhibit a 13.89 percentage point lower probability of entering 
key high schools, compared with those who never experienced UHD5. Considering that children 
may sit for the HET at different ages and that the HET may be organized at the county level, for 
the robustness of our results, we also provide the regression results under the assumption of 
sitting for the HET at age 16 and 17 years and with county fixed effects. We consistently find the 
same patterns in all cases. These results suggest not only the CET but also the HET performance 
of children is significantly and negatively affected by UHD experiences.    
Third, the data from the 2013 CHIP used in this section is only cross-sectional; thus, we 
are unable to add household or children fixed effects to control for more confounding factors as 
we do in the former sections. We conduct placebo tests to verify further whether the differences 
in children’s educational achievement are affected by UHD experiences or only by UHD-related 
confounding factors. More specifically, we use a placebo variable of UHD experiences, 
UHDh
placebo, in which we define children who experienced UHD after sitting for the CET or HET 
as our treatment group instead. Table 8 and 9 show the regression results of these placebo tests. 
As we expect, all coefficients of UHDh
placebo are statistically insignificant, and the magnitudes are 
 
5 We propose UHD children’s relatively lower performance in CET and HET are driven by the decline in 
their parents’ propensity to accumulate children’s human capital. But it also may be the case that children 
in UHD family become less willing to study hard due to the improved family wealth after UHD. We find 
this impact exists, but is not statistically significant by doing additional regressions. Because the CFPS data 
we employ only covers a short period of time, insignificant impact in the short term may become 
significant over the long term. This issue can be explored in future research. But at present, we do not have 
strong evidence to support this proposition. 
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relatively much smaller, for example, -15.33 in column (1) of Table 6 versus -1.13 in column (1) 
of Table 8. These results of the placebo tests could lend further support to our explanation, in 
which household wealth growth from UHD has a detrimental influence on children’s human 
capital accumulation.  
  
35 
 
Table 6 
CET performance of children 
Variables 
 
CET scores Elite 
universities 
 CET scores Elite 
universities 
 CET scores Elite 
universities 
 CET scores Elite 
universities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Full sample   Bottom and top 1% CET 
scores are excluded. 
 Bottom and top 5% CET 
scores are excluded. 
 CET scores higher than 700 
and lower 200 are excluded. 
UHD -15.3257* 
(9.1094) 
[0.0891] 
-0.0956** 
(0.0426) 
[0.0396] 
 -19.1524** 
(8.6038) 
[0.0297] 
-0.1049** 
(0.0431) 
[0.0198] 
 -22.6201*** 
(7.7201) 
[0.0099] 
-0.1015** 
(0.0434) 
[0.0198] 
 -17.1062** 
(8.7821) 
[0.0495] 
-0.0972** 
(0.0428) 
[0.0396] 
Family size -1.7659 
(3.2978) 
-0.0136 
(0.0157) 
 -1.7471 
(3.0898) 
-0.0111 
(0.0157) 
 -3.3087 
(2.7637) 
-0.0138 
(0.0157) 
 -0.7372 
(3.1808) 
-0.0127 
(0.0159) 
Children 
number 
-3.8765 
(3.8765) 
0.0260 
(0.0187) 
 -3.4205 
(3.6227) 
0.0262 
(0.0187) 
 -0.8392 
(3.2294) 
0.0335* 
(0.0185) 
 -4.6464 
(3.7271) 
0.0260 
(0.0188) 
Nationality 
(Han or not) 
4.7169 
(10.7662) 
0.0321 
(0.0510) 
 -0.7977 
(10.0388) 
0.0244 
(0.0509) 
 -1.8629 
(8.7624) 
0.0114 
(0.0494) 
 0.0303 
(10.4020) 
0.0282 
(0.0515) 
Gender (boy or 
not) 
-8.2489 
(5.0445) 
-0.0124 
(0.0234) 
 -10.1476** 
(4.7280) 
-0.0187 
(0.0234) 
 -9.7889** 
(4.2566) 
-0.0234 
(0.0236) 
 -8.5977* 
(4.8574) 
-0.0111 
(0.0235) 
Education 
years of 
household 
heads 
3.6250*** 
(0.8854) 
0.0153*** 
(0.0041) 
 3.5037*** 
(0.8276) 
0.0152*** 
(0.0041) 
 2.5992*** 
(0.7561) 
0.0153*** 
(0.0042) 
 3.6547*** 
(0.8515) 
0.0153*** 
(0.0041) 
CET year fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
CET category 
fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
CET province 
fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 1321 1140  1290 1120  1179 1031  1312 1135 
R2 0.1866 0.0852  0.1786 0.0825  0.1698 0.0864  0.1849 0.0859 
Notes. Regressions are based on the 2013 CHIP data. For the variable of elite universities, 1 is for entering elite universities and 0 is for not. UHD is 1 for those who experienced 
UHD before sitting for the CET and 0 for those who never experienced UHD. Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering over the province. Romano-Wolf 
stepdown p-values in square brackets are produced for multiple hypotheses of the effects of UHD. The variables of columns (1) and (2) are jointly tested, and the same for columns 
(3) and (4), columns (5) and (6), and columns (7) and (8). ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 7 
HET performance of children 
Variables Key high schools 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Assumption of sitting for the 
HET at age 15 years 
 Assumption of sitting for the 
HET at age 16 years 
 Assumption of sitting for the 
HET at age 17 years 
UHD -0.1389*** 
(0.0405) 
-0.1370*** 
(0.0373) 
 -0.1332*** 
(0.0412) 
-0.1325*** 
(0.0370) 
 -0.1311*** 
(0.0435) 
-0.1301*** 
(0.0375) 
Family size -0.0025 
(0.0122) 
-0.0069 
(0.0123) 
 -0.0013 
(0.0122) 
-0.0061 
(0.0123) 
 -0.0014 
(0.0122) 
-0.0060 
(0.0123) 
Children 
number 
-0.0091 
(0.0156) 
-0.0066 
(0.0150) 
 -0.0095 
(0.0156) 
-0.0071 
(0.0151) 
 -0.0094 
(0.0155) 
-0.0064 
(0.0150) 
Nationality 
(Han or not) 
-0.0416 
(0.0561) 
-0.0566 
(0.0597) 
 -0.0388 
(0.0566) 
-0.0558 
(0.0592) 
 -0.0394 
(0.0566) 
-0.0561 
(0.0592) 
Gender (boy or 
not) 
-0.0519** 
(0.0205) 
-0.0503** 
(0.0213) 
 -0.0506** 
(0.0207) 
-0.0496** 
(0.0213) 
 -0.0519** 
(0.0207) 
-0.0503** 
(0.0212) 
Education 
years of 
household 
heads 
0.0337*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0319*** 
(0.0043) 
 0.0337*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0320*** 
(0.0043) 
 0.0336*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0320*** 
(0.0043) 
HET year fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
HET city fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
HET county 
fixed effects 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 No 
 
Yes 
 
 No 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 2391 2390  2406 2405  2422 2420 
R2 0.1915 0.2519  0.1906 0.2515  0.1915 0.2522 
Notes. Regressions are based on the 2013 CHIP data. For the variable of key high schools, 1 is for entering key high schools and 0 is for not. UHD is 1 for those who experienced 
UHD before sitting for the HET and 0 for those who never experienced UHD. Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering over the city in columns (1), (3), 
and (5) and clustering over the county in columns (2), (4), and (6). ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 8 
Placebo tests (CET performance of children) 
Variables 
 
CET scores Elite 
universities 
 CET 
scores 
Elite 
universities 
 CET 
scores 
Elite 
universities 
 CET 
scores 
Elite 
universities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Full sample   Bottom and top 1% CET 
scores are excluded. 
 Bottom and top 5% CET 
scores are excluded. 
 CET scores higher than 
700 and lower 200 are 
excluded. 
UHD_placebo -1.1335 
(14.3015) 
[0.9505] 
-0.0202 
(0.0700) 
[0.9505] 
 2.3037 
(13.2440) 
[0.9802] 
-0.0134 
(0.0704) 
[0.9802] 
 2.6409 
(11.9599) 
[0.9604] 
0.0128 
(0.0731) 
[0.9604] 
 4.1269 
(13.6979) 
[0.9406] 
-0.0137 
(0.0711) 
[0.9406] 
Family size -0.1497 
(3.3719) 
-0.0027 
(0.0162) 
 -0.7830 
(3.1186) 
-0.0007 
(0.0162) 
 -3.1281 
(2.7881) 
-0.0055 
(0.0163) 
 0.0066 
(3.2059) 
-0.0023 
(0.0163) 
Children 
number 
-4.8305 
(4.0070) 
0.0250 
(0.0194) 
 -3.9972 
(3.7008) 
0.0252 
(0.0194) 
 -1.1900 
(3.2952) 
0.0318 
(0.0194) 
 -5.2411 
(3.8015) 
0.0252 
(0.0195) 
Nationality 
(Han or not) 
8.8024 
(11.2089) 
0.0478 
(0.0529) 
 2.9593 
(10.3378) 
0.0387 
(0.0529) 
 1.9491 
(8.9956) 
0.0267 
(0.0516) 
 3.5059 
(10.6967) 
0.0434 
(0.0535) 
Gender (boy or 
not) 
-4.0489 
(5.2543) 
-0.0211 
(0.0245) 
 -8.3197* 
(4.8703) 
-0.0275 
(0.0244) 
 -8.3736* 
(4.3625) 
-0.0306 
(0.0248) 
 -6.4148 
(5.0006) 
-0.0206 
(0.0246) 
Education 
years of 
household 
heads 
3.6075*** 
(0.9107) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0042) 
 3.4813*** 
(0.8412) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0042) 
 2.5480*** 
(0.7599) 
0.0138*** 
(0.0043) 
 3.5974*** 
(0.8647) 
0.0145*** 
(0.0043) 
CET year fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
CET category 
fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
CET province 
fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 1259 1084  1231 1067  1124 981  1250 1079 
R2 0.1801 0.0849  0.1789 0.0827  0.1697 0.0845  0.1853 0.0860 
Notes. Regressions are based on the 2013 CHIP data. For the variable of elite universities, 1 is for entering elite universities and 0 is for not. UHDhplacebo is 1 for those who 
experienced UHD after sitting for the CET and 0 for those who never experienced UHD. Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering over the province. 
Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values in square brackets are produced for multiple hypotheses of the effects of UHD. The variables of columns (1) and (2) are jointly tested, and the 
same for columns (3) and (4), columns (5) and (6), and columns (7) and (8). ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 9 
Placebo tests (HET performance of children) 
Variables Key high schools 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Assumption of sitting for the 
HET at age 15 years 
 Assumption of sitting for the 
HET at age 16 years 
 Assumption of sitting for the 
HET at age 17 years 
UHD_placebo -0.0580 
(0.0494) 
-0.0462 
(0.0512) 
 -0.0613 
(0.0480) 
-0.0456 
(0.0508) 
 -0.0559 
(0.0458) 
-0.0379 
(0.0543) 
Family size -0.0004 
(0.0132) 
-0.0048 
(0.0133) 
 -0.0011 
(0.0131) 
-0.0055 
(0.0131) 
 -0.0010 
(0.0131) 
-0.0056 
(0.0130) 
Children 
number 
-0.0085 
(0.0166) 
-0.0052 
(0.0150) 
 -0.0084 
(0.0167) 
-0.0049 
(0.0151) 
 -0.0086 
(0.0169) 
-0.0054 
(0.0151) 
Nationality 
(Han or not) 
-0.0223 
(0.0558) 
-0.0287 
(0.0571) 
 -0.0233 
(0.0559) 
-0.0294 
(0.0573) 
 -0.0227 
(0.0557) 
-0.0280 
(0.0572) 
Gender (boy or 
not) 
-0.0602*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0564** 
(0.0222) 
 -0.0609*** 
(0.0218) 
-0.0566** 
(0.0225) 
 -0.0601*** 
(0.0217) 
-0.0563** 
(0.0225) 
Education 
years of 
household 
heads 
0.0342*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0323*** 
(0.0044) 
 0.0341*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0322*** 
(0.0044) 
 0.0342*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0321*** 
(0.0045) 
HET year fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
HET city fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
HET county 
fixed effects 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 No 
 
Yes 
 
 No 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 2336 2334  2321 2319  2305 2303 
R2 0.2010 0.2620  0.2009 0.2616  0.1998 0.2609 
Notes. Regressions are based on the 2013 CHIP data. For the variable of key high schools, 1 is for entering key high schools and 0 is for not. UHDhplacebo is 1 for those who 
experienced UHD after sitting for the HET and 0 for those who never experienced UHD. Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering over the city in columns 
(1), (3), and (5) and clustering over the county in columns (2), (4), and (6). ***, **, and * mean that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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6. Conclusion 
The case of UHD in China provides a unique opportunity to assess the impact of 
household wealth growth on children’s human capital again by following the seminal research by 
Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) and Cesarini et al. (2016). To address this issue, we use the empirical 
setup of the differences in whether households (i.e., individuals from those households) 
experienced UHD. Thanks to the real estate boom, the considerable economic compensation from 
UHD is probably the best chance for ordinary Chinese households to obtain such substantial 
wealth growth. Therefore, the scope of the study of wealth effects in China is defined.   
Our data reveal that the household wealth growth induced by UHD is as much as 15 years 
of Chinese individual income, and consequently, reduces individual labor supply. Compared with 
non-UHD individuals, the probability of being employed for UHD individuals would decrease by 
3.77 percentage points in the post-UHD era, especially for women (8.79 percentage points for 
women vs. 1.48 percentage points for men). Accompanying the decline in labor supply, adults’ 
propensity to invest in their children’s human capital correspondingly decreases in tutoring hours 
and educational expectations for their children after experiencing UHD, as we predict in our 
explanation. Eventually, the educational achievement of the UHD children who experienced 
UHD before their CET or HET is relatively lower than non-UHD children, who never 
experienced UHD. More specifically, UHD children have CET scores approximately 20 points 
lower, are ten percentage points less likely to enter elite universities, and are 13 percentage points 
less likely to enter key high schools. 
Our study mainly contributes to further understanding the surprising finding of Bleakley 
and Ferrie (2016) and Cesarini et al. (2016), in which substantial wealth growth from winning a 
lottery has negative but not very significant influences on children’s human capital accumulation. 
This “shocking behavior” (Bleakley and Ferrie, 2016) inspires us to explore again the association 
40 
 
between wealth growth and human capital despite the abundant literature documenting the 
positive association (Filmer and Schady, 2011; Lovenheim, 2011; Dahl and Lochner, 2012). Our 
results suggest it is rational for individuals to reduce human capital accumulation when their labor 
supply is decreased by substantial wealth growth since labor earnings and human capital are 
probably no longer the primary. It would be of interest to further examine the wealth effects on 
human capital aside from the only perspective of relaxing economic constraints for education. 
The side effects of wealth should arouse more research attention. 
Our study also provides a diverse perspective to evaluate real estate development in 
China given that China has faced a critical dilemma in its housing policy (Yao et al., 2014). On 
the one hand, real estate development plays a significant role in promoting China’s economic 
growth and mitigating local governments’ fiscal deficits (Pan et al., 2015); on the other hand, 
except for the argument about the housing bubble (Glaeser et al., 2017; Mao and Shen, 2019), 
some empirical findings regarding the consequences of soaring housing prices (Li and Wu, 2014; 
Chen et al., 2018; Wrenn et al., 2019) have evoked strong concern that the future success of 
China’s economy would be undermined by the persistent real estate boom. Our results imply that 
the widespread UHD behind the real estate development in China could aggravate this problem, 
owing to the decline in labor supply and human capital accumulation induced by UHD, which are 
two key factors in economic development. 
Finally, our results should be interpreted with some limitations in mind. First, as Hällsten 
and Pfeffer (2017) stress, exogenous wealth growth differs from other types of wealth growth 
such as family accumulated wealth. Hence, caution should be used regarding generalization of 
our findings to other situations, for example, household wealth growth due to increased income. 
Second, the UHD information, household wealth condition, working status, adults’ propensity to 
accumulate their children’s human capital, and children’s education performance are all self-
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reported, which may bias the results. We suggest that future research measure all these variables 
with administrative data and check the robustness of our findings. 
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